As the leader of the opposition David Cameron promised a new age of government in this TED talk. He argues that the purpose of government is not just to create economic growth, but also to promote individual happiness. He draws upon recent work from the emerging fields of behavioural economics and the science of happiness to show how government can effectively maximise happiness.
The question I want to ask is whether happiness-maximisation should be the goal of government, and in particular, whether findings from the science of happiness can help us answer this question?
Happiness researchers claim that they are using evermore valid and reliable measures of happiness (or “subjective well-being”), which provide interpersonally and cross-culturally comparable data on people’s level of happiness. Let us take their word on this for the moment. That is, I am not concerned here with whether happiness researchers are working under a conception of happiness that we care about and refer to in our important life decisions – let us assume that they are. I am also not concerned here with whether happiness researchers are accurately and reliably measuring the conception of happiness in question – let us assume that they have (or are getting close to having) this sorted as well. Both of these assumptions are big assumptions, which I think we have reason to be sceptical about, but these issues are not my current concern.
I am concerned here with the role that happiness-maximisation should have in public policy. Even if it the case that the science of happiness is beginning to answer important questions about how to be happy, it is not entirely obvious that the goal of government is simply to further this cause. Of course, political utilitarianism argues that it is the sole goal of government. But utilitarianism has its traditional discontents. Amartya Sen in Development as Freedom (1999) famously argued that utilitarianism is inadequate in that it does not depend on things like the violation of rights, the fulfilment of duties, etc., as independent of happiness. Under a utilitarian framework, these things count only if (and only insofar as) they have effects on happiness. Further, according to utilitarianism only the sum totals of happiness matter, and that other properties such as the underlying distribution of happiness does not. Both of these points strike many people as incorrect or at least immoral.
So the role of happiness-maximisation in public policy is far from clear. However, to most people it seems obvious that happiness is a good thing and that the government should play some kind of role in promoting it. The question I want to ask here is if findings from the science of happiness can contribute towards answering the question of whether happiness-maximisation should be the goal of government.
Some may object at this point that no matter how much information is produced to show under what conditions people are happy, these conclusions, on their own, can have no morally compelling basis for the actions of governments. Libertarians, for instance, argue that the obligations of government are merely to preserve the liberties of the individual. But what if happiness research showed that to a certain extent it is the preservation of liberties that makes people happy? Would this not provide support both for libertarianism and utilitarianism, if each view complemented the other? Indeed, this is a fairly robust finding in the subjective well-being literature. Whereas absolute income, status, climate, passive leisure and consumption, marital status, having children and non-intimate relationships have all been found to contribute little to our happiness, political and social freedom does reliably make people happier (or significantly unhappy in their absence).
Perhaps the most important factors in answering this question are the psychological findings on the role of happiness in our functioning. One of the most influential findings from the subjective well-being literature is that our level of happiness does not sufficiently rise with our material standard of living; in most situations individuals adapt to new circumstances, returning to their “set-point” level of happiness. Rather, our “happiness-system” has the role of orientating ourselves through changes in our circumstances in order to make progress in the things that we care about. Thus, it looks like maximising happiness is not achieved in itself through maximising enduring material resources, but by maximising the ability of individuals to engage in learning, the effective pursuit of goals, shared projects, discovering activities that are intrinsically rewarding, and so on. This is strikingly similar to Sen’s “capability approach,” which argues that the aim of government is to provide people with the capabilities to achieve valuable “functionings.”
In sum, utilitarianism and the role of happiness-maximisation in public policy has traditionally been criticised on the grounds that it leaves various values unaccounted for (freedoms, rights, equality etc.). However, happiness researchers have the potential to discover the relationships between these values and individual happiness. I think there is already evidence suggesting essential relationships between some of these values and individual happiness, in which case the role of government in promoting these values and promoting happiness may be identical. This is far from uncontroversial, but we should welcome the fact that the science of happiness can provide empirical support to this age-old (and increasingly relevant) philosophical debate.
Should happiness-maximisations be the goal of government?
Happiness researchers claim that they are using evermore valid and reliable measures of happiness (or “subjective well-being”), which provide interpersonally and cross-culturally comparable data on people’s level of happiness. Let us take their word on this for the moment. That is, I am not concerned here with whether happiness researchers are working under a conception of happiness that we care about and refer to in our important life decisions – let us assume that they are. I am also not concerned here with whether happiness researchers are accurately and reliably measuring the conception of happiness in question – let us assume that they have (or are getting close to having) this sorted as well. Both of these assumptions are big assumptions, which I think we have reason to be sceptical about, but these issues are not my current concern.
I am concerned here with the role that happiness-maximisation should have in public policy. Even if it the case that the science of happiness is beginning to answer important questions about how to be happy, it is not entirely obvious that the goal of government is simply to further this cause. Of course, political utilitarianism argues that it is the sole goal of government. But utilitarianism has its traditional discontents. Amartya Sen in Development as Freedom (1999) famously argued that utilitarianism is inadequate in that it does not depend on things like the violation of rights, the fulfilment of duties, etc., as independent of happiness. Under a utilitarian framework, these things count only if (and only insofar as) they have effects on happiness. Further, according to utilitarianism only the sum totals of happiness matter, and that other properties such as the underlying distribution of happiness does not. Both of these points strike many people as incorrect or at least immoral.
So the role of happiness-maximisation in public policy is far from clear. However, to most people it seems obvious that happiness is a good thing and that the government should play some kind of role in promoting it. The question I want to ask here is if findings from the science of happiness can contribute towards answering the question of whether happiness-maximisation should be the goal of government.
Some may object at this point that no matter how much information is produced to show under what conditions people are happy, these conclusions, on their own, can have no morally compelling basis for the actions of governments. Libertarians, for instance, argue that the obligations of government are merely to preserve the liberties of the individual. But what if happiness research showed that to a certain extent it is the preservation of liberties that makes people happy? Would this not provide support both for libertarianism and utilitarianism, if each view complemented the other? Indeed, this is a fairly robust finding in the subjective well-being literature. Whereas absolute income, status, climate, passive leisure and consumption, marital status, having children and non-intimate relationships have all been found to contribute little to our happiness, political and social freedom does reliably make people happier (or significantly unhappy in their absence).
Perhaps the most important factors in answering this question are the psychological findings on the role of happiness in our functioning. One of the most influential findings from the subjective well-being literature is that our level of happiness does not sufficiently rise with our material standard of living; in most situations individuals adapt to new circumstances, returning to their “set-point” level of happiness. Rather, our “happiness-system” has the role of orientating ourselves through changes in our circumstances in order to make progress in the things that we care about. Thus, it looks like maximising happiness is not achieved in itself through maximising enduring material resources, but by maximising the ability of individuals to engage in learning, the effective pursuit of goals, shared projects, discovering activities that are intrinsically rewarding, and so on. This is strikingly similar to Sen’s “capability approach,” which argues that the aim of government is to provide people with the capabilities to achieve valuable “functionings.”
In sum, utilitarianism and the role of happiness-maximisation in public policy has traditionally been criticised on the grounds that it leaves various values unaccounted for (freedoms, rights, equality etc.). However, happiness researchers have the potential to discover the relationships between these values and individual happiness. I think there is already evidence suggesting essential relationships between some of these values and individual happiness, in which case the role of government in promoting these values and promoting happiness may be identical. This is far from uncontroversial, but we should welcome the fact that the science of happiness can provide empirical support to this age-old (and increasingly relevant) philosophical debate.
Interesting stuff. My first thought is that it all seems more plausible when you think of freedoms, rights, equality just as rival ‘values’ that need ‘promoting’, whereas perhaps we tend to think of some human rights (for example) as inviolable. If considerations like that just end up as another number in the overall sum, it’s hard to see how we can avoid counter-examples where violating people’s rights can be justified on the grounds of happiness-maximisation. Still, it would help the utilitarian case to some extent if these counter-examples could be shown to be relatively few.
Jim, I think you’re absolutely right. Even if it the case that increases in happiness tend to significantly correlate with the promotion of various basic rights, there is still the issue of which one (happiness, rights, or something else) is of primary value.
Personally, I am not a utilitarian or a welfarist (that is, I do not think that either happiness or well-being is the only thing of ultimate value), but I do think think that happiness provides a very good guide for (or, indeed, constitutes) the things that are of ultimate value. What makes people happy is valuable in itself. If equality makes people happy, then it is equality that is ultimately valuable (not the happiness it provides). Likewise for liberty, dignity and all the rest.
This is a fairly novel argument that I think happiness/well-being researchers, liberals and libertarians should all be able to accept. Further, it can provide them with an empirical grounding for justifying their claims.